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Introduction 
 
 "More firms than ever, and in more industries and countries, are expanding abroad 
through [foreign] direct investment [FDI]."1  Although FDI in 1980 was equivalent to only 5% of 
world GDP, by the end of the 1990's, that percentage had more than tripled to 17%.2  In 1993, 
the total US dollar value of world FDI was only US$ 200 billion, but by the year 2000, it had 
risen to US$ 1.3 thousand billion. 3  Developing countries received around 25% of these inflows, 
mostly in the form of "greenfield" investments, where a new enterprise is essentially created 
from scratch. 4 
 FDI is particularly welcome in developing countries for several reasons.  First, it 
"contributes toward financing sustained economic growth over the long term," and is "especially 
important for its potential to . . . ultimately eradicate poverty through economic growth and 
development."5  Second, it is a source of capital that, unlike "private capital markets investments 
(equity and debt securities, and bank lending)" and loan-based official development assistance 
(ODA), does not increase the national debt load.6  Further, FDI, at least in its greenfield 
incarnation, is the least volatile capital inflow. 7  The OECD has even described it as "patient" 
due to its generally irreversible character.8  Finally, in addition to raw capital, FDI brings with it 
                                                 
1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Foreign Direct 
Investment for Development [–] Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs 46 (2002) (visited Oct. 
18, 2002) <http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/2002061E.pdf> (hereinafter, FDI Book).  
2 Id. at 48, citing UNCTAD, World Investment Report – Promoting Linkages (2001). 
3 Id. at 47. 
4  Id. at 43, 48-49. 
5 Final outcome of the International Conference on Financing for Development [–] Monterrey 
Consensus, U.N. International Conference on Financing for Development, Provisional Agenda 
Item 11, at ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/3 (2002) (visited Oct. 13, 2002) 
<http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/0302finalMonterreyConsensus.pdf >. 
6 Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties:  A Balanced Approach to Multinational 
Corporations, 39 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 483, 498 (2000). 
7 Id. at 498-499. 
8 FDI Book, supra note 1 at 44. 
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an increase in healthy competition, exports, and foreign exchange,9 as well as an upgrade in local 
technology and managerial skills (the "spillover" effect).10 
 
FDI and Tax Incentives 
 
 According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), FDI occurs "when an investor based 
in one country (the home country) acquires an asset in another country (the host country) with 
the intent to manage that asset."11  Of the "location" factors influencing an investor, one – 
taxation (or, more particularly, the lack of it) – can be pivotal when the other factors in two or 
more competing host countries are roughly equal.  For instance, Harry Grubert and John Mutti 
have calculated that a decrease in host country taxation from 20% to 10% will result in a 65% 
increase in net plant and equipment of U.S. subsidiaries.12  Peter Wilson has discriminated 
between service and production subsidiaries, noting that "tax considerations largely dictate 
location decisions for business activities . . . such as administrative and distribution centers," but 
that for production locations, taxes inhere in but rarely dominate the decision process.13 
 A certain amount of competition for FDI based on tax considerations is to be expected 
because every country has a sovereign right to decide the level of public services it wishes to 
provide, and the level of taxes needed to fund those services.  However, tax competition can be 
harmful when the benefits of lower or no taxes are apportioned exclusively to FDI investors, and 
                                                 
9 Eric M. Burt, Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct 
Investment in the World Trade Organization, 12 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1015, 1019 n.20 
(1997). 
10 Kelley, supra note 6 at 498-499. 
11 WTO, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, PRESS/57 (Oct. 9, 1996) 6, cited in Burt, supra 
note 9 at 1019 n.20. 
12 See Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Taxes, Tariffs, and Transfer Pricing in Multinational 
Corporate Decision Making, 73 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 285, 290 (1991). 
13 See G. Peter Wilson, The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions, in Studies in 
Internationa l Taxation 195, 229 (Alberto Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard & Joel Slemrod eds., 
1993). 
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the host country's tax burden is shifted to immobile segments of society like land and workers. 
For example, until recently, Ireland offered tax preferences for production-oriented FDI.  That 
was harmful tax competition because the rest of Irish society had to bear the entire tax burden, 
allowing the production-oriented FDI to free ride – to enjoy the benefits provided by taxes 
without paying a fair or proportional share of them.  In connection with the monetary union 
recently achieved by the European Union, Ireland abolished these tax preferences and adopted a 
lower tax rate for all corporations.14 
Unfair, or harmful tax competition by countries seeking FDI is destructive for both host 
and home countries because it threatens the social insurance programs of developed countries 
that make globalization socially possible.15  It almost goes without saying that the home 
countries for multinational enterprises capable of engaging in FDI are usually developed 
nations.16  Globalization inherently threatens home country employment by opening up the 
opportunities that host countries offer.17  Without social insurance programs to cushion the 
impact (or apparent impact) of these opportunities on home country employment and the 
retirement savings (public and private) that employment generates, a political backlash against 
globalization would almost certainly develop, as it did in the early twentieth century. 18  Host 
countries that engage in unfair tax competition, therefore, are free riders whose opportunism 
threatens to destroy the very system from which they benefit.19  This problem is complicated by 
the dilemma of the commons:  cessation of harmful tax competition by any one country will lead 
only to that country’s deprivation, and will not contribute to rescue of globalization, if other 
                                                 
14 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573, 1625-1631, 1644, 1646, 1654, 1656 (2000). 
15 Id. at 1635. 
16 Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct Investment:  Alternatives to 
Tax Incentive Policies, 7 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 208, 214 (1985). 
17 Avi-Yonah, supra note 14 at 1635. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 1592. 
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countries continue to predate through tax holidays and tax preference regimes.20 
 Predatory tax practices attack the social insurance programs of developed countries by 
siphoning off capital, and with it, the tax revenues that capital would have generated.  To 
forestall an immediate cutback in social insurance, the home countries shift the tax burden 
previously allocated to that capital to a less mobile factor – labor – via consumption and payroll 
taxes.21  "Because the rich save more than the poor, taxes on labor are generally more regressive 
than taxes on capital or on savings.  Thus, a shift in the tax burden from capital to labor tends to 
render the tax system more regressive.  As a result, the overall distribution of income in the 
home countries tends to become more inequitable . . . ."22  This increase in inequity is not 
invisible, and therefore there is a social limit to the increases that labor will accept.  When that 
limit is reached, social insurance programs must begin to shrink, and that withdrawal of support, 
combined with the increased taxes on labor, foments an unrest that becomes the hotbed for a new 
round of protectionism.23 
 Harmful tax competition also presents an efficiency problem  Investment is efficient 
when capital is allocated to its most productive (and therefore highest-yielding) pretax use.24  For 
efficiency to be preserved in the presence of taxes, all tax rates have to be the same, at least from 
the perspective of the investor.25  When countries successfully compete by offering lower tax 
rates than their neighbors for similar enterprises, the result is inefficient allocation of funds.  
                                                 
20 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244, 1246 (1968); 
OECD, Harmful Tax Competition [–] An Emerging Global Issue ¶ 89 (1998) (visited Oct. 20. 
2002) <http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00004000/M00004517.pdf>. 
21 Avi-Yonah, supra note 14 at 1576, 1624.  
22 Id. at 1624. 
23 Id. at 1576. 
24 Id. at 1604.  
25 This concept is called Capital Export Neutrality (CEN).  See Peggy B. Musgrave, United 
States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: Issues and Arguments (1969); see also James R. 
Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A Deferential Reconsideration, 52 Nat'l Tax J. 385 (1999) 
(re-evaluating the validity of CEN analysis). 
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While fair tax competition might also seem to cause inefficiency, it sometimes is not a drag on 
efficient allocation of funds because the lower level of services and infrastructure resulting from 
a lower society-wide tax rate results in a change in the productivity matrix.  The country is 
functionally different on a physical level, as a result of but in addition to its different tax rates.  
In those cases where fair competition does create inefficiency, it must at present be accepted as 
the price for democratic societies.  However, in the latter case, if the funds available worldwide 
for taxation are viewed as a commons, Garrett Hardin's suggestion that opportunism be curtailed 
by "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon" presents a possible solution. 26 
 The potential for "mutual coercion" to be a solution for harmful tax competition can be 
seen in the OECD's remarkably successful efforts to curtail tax havens.  When the OECD 
published "Toward Global Tax Co-operation" in 2000, it included a "technical conclusions" list 
of 35 countries whose tax practices met the OECD criteria for tax havens.27  However, by April 
18, 2002, when the OECD finally published its "List of Unco-operative [sic] Tax Havens," only 
seven of these had not agreed on some level to cooperate in changing their challenged 
practices.28  To be sure, this road was not a smooth one,29 and, as noted, some countries continue 
                                                 
26 Hardin, supra note 20 at 1247-1248. 
27 OECD, Towards Global Tax Co-operation[,] Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting 
and Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs[,] Progress in Identifying and 
Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices 17 (2000) (visited Oct. 12, 2002) 
<http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M000014000/M00014130.pdf>. 
28 Those seven are Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, the Principality of 
Monaco, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Nauru, and the Republic of 
Vanuatu.  OECD, List of Unco-operative Tax Havens (visited Oct. 7, 2002) 
<http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-22-nodirectorate-no-4-28534-22,00.html>.   
29 At the March 2001 meeting in Paris, the Commonwealth countries called the OECD's 
threatened sanctions "high-handed and undemocratic."  Akiko Hishikawa, Note, The Death of 
Tax Havens?, 25 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 389, 410 & n.198 (2002), citing Mark Atkinson, 
OECD Accused of Tyranny: Caribbean Leader Alleges Double Standards at Tax Havens Talks, 
The Guardian (London), Mar. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 14955197.  At that same meeting, 
"Prime Minister Arthur of Barbados expressed his anger by 'snubbing' a dinner held in his honor 
and accused the OECD of '"technocratic tyranny" by "nameless, faceless" people with "no 
common sense."'"  Hishikawa, supra at 410 & n.200, citing Atkinson, supra.  The threatened 
sanctions were not in every case mere threats.  Both Nauru and Niue had been "isolated from the 
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to hold out (one, fiercely).30  At the same time, as a result of several meetings held between 2000 
and April 2002,31 the OECD modified its original deadlines for commitment to change.32  
Nevertheless, this merely confirms that the coercion taking place is mutual and therefore 
working just as Hardin suggested thirty-four years ago.33 
 
FDI Tax Incentives and the WTO 
 
 In addition to being inequitable and inefficient, unfair tax competition through incentives 
limited to FDI investors is frequently contrary to the standards set in WTO agreements.34  In 
                                                                                                                                                             
world banking system" by the time of the February 2001 OECD meeting in Tokyo.  Hishikawa, 
supra at 409 & n.186, citing Michael Field, Pacific Tax Havens Heading for International 
Showdown, Agence Fr. Presse, Feb. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2341018. 
30 Vanuatu has referred to the OECD's initiative as "equivalent to blackmail" and said it is 
reminiscent of the "'"neo-colonial attitude" of countries such as Britain, France, and Germany.'" 
Hishikawa, supra note 23 at 415 & n.247, citing We Will Not Comply, Vanuatu Tells OECD, 
Pac. Islands Broad. Assoc. News Serv., Feb. 26, 2002, available at 2002 WL 332240. 
31 The OECD published its Framework for a Collective Memorandum of Understanding on 
Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (MOU), on November 24, 2000.  See OECD, Framework for 
a Collective Memorandum of Understanding on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (visited Oct. 
12, 2002) <http://www.oecd.org/media/MOUrev20novR1.pdf>; OECD Publishes Framework for 
a Collective Memorandum of Understanding on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (visited Oct. 
12, 2002) <http://www1.oecd.org/media/release/nw00-123a.htm>; Hishikawa, supra note 29 at 
400.  Thereafter, the following meetings were held:  Barbados and London, January 2001; 
Tokyo, February 2001; Paris, March and June 2001.  Hishikawa, supra note 29 at 403-413. 
32 At a meeting in Paris in June 2001, the OECD agreed not to impose sanctions on countries 
merely for offering tax breaks to foreign investors.  Hishikawa, supra note 29 at 413 & n.225, 
citing Daniel J. Mitchell, The OECD Pulls a Bait-and-Switch on the U.S. Treasury, Wall St. J. 
Eur., July 11, 2001, at 7, available at 2001 WL-WSJE 21832801 and Michael M. Phillips, OECD 
Reaches Pact on Tax Havens, Wall St. J. Eur., June 29, 2001, at 3, available at 2001 WL-WSJE 
21832014. 
33 Hardin, supra note 20. 
34 Subsidies on some agricultural products are conditionally permitted by the WTO. See 
Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations[:]  Legal 
Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, vol. 27, Arts. 3, 9 (1994) (visited Oct. 14, 2002) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf> (hereinafter AA).  This paper does not 
address these subsidies. 
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general, tax practices that result in the foregoing of tax that would otherwise be due and that are 
contingent either on export performance or on the use of domestic over imported inputs are a 
violation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).35  As such, 
they subject the offending country (if it is one of the WTO's 144 members36) to litigation 
pursuant to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)37 and to the possibility of 
countervailing duties on the products favored by the "tax subsidy."38  However, as will be 
discussed, application of these requirements to least developed39 and developing countries40 is 
                                                 
35 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations[:]  Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations Done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, vol. 27, Art. 3.1 (1994) (visited Aug. 
23, 2002) <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf> (hereinafter SCM). 
36 See WTO, The Organization [–] Members and Observers, (visited Oct. 14, 2002) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> (listing the 144 WTO 
members as of Jan. 1, 2002). 
37 Understanding On Rules And Procedures Governing The Settlement Of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations[:]  Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, vol. 31 
(1994) (visited Oct. 14, 2002) <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf> 
(hereinafter DSU). 
38 SCM, supra note 35 at Arts. 10, 19-21. 
39 Least developed countries (LDC's) for WTO purposes are those countries so designated by the 
United Nations.  See U.N., Who are the Developing Countries? (visited Oct. 17, 2002) 
<http://www.unctad.org/conference/>.  Forty-nine countries are currently designated as LDC's 
by the U.N., and thirty of them, including Haiti, are WTO members.  See WTO, Least Developed 
Countries (visited Oct. 14, 2002) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm>. 
40 Around 100 of the WTO's 144 members are developing countries, a status that is self-
proclaimed but which may be challenged.  See WTO, Developing Countries (visited Oct. 16, 
2002) <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev0_e.htm>; WTO, Who are the 
Developing Countries in the WTO? (visited Oct. 16, 2002) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm>. 
 – 9 – 
either foregone or delayed until a particular per capita GNP is reached or a certain period of time 
has elapsed.41 
SCM, Article 1 
 Revenue foregone as a result of a tax incentive is defined as a subsidy in SCM, Art. 1: 
Members hereby agree as follows: 
 
 PART I:  GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
 Article 1 
 
 Definition of a Subsidy 
 
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
 
 (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public 
body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as 
"government"), i.e. where: 
  . . . 
 
  (ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or 
not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
  . . . 
 and 
 
  (b) a benefit is thereby conferred.  
 
 Determining whether a particular measure results in the foregoing of tax otherwise due 
involves application of a fairly straightforward test to a factually dependent legal matrix.  The 
test is "but for":  "but for" the challenged measure, would tax liability be higher?42  The proper 
matrix of law to which the "but for" test should be applied is factually dependent due to the 
                                                 
41 See SCM, supra note 35 at Art. 27, Annex VII.  Annex VII refers to "GNP per capita" and 
states that it relies on World Bank data for this information.  However, the World Bank has 
changed its terminology from "GNP per capita" to "GNI [Gross National Income] per capita."  
See World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001:  Changes in Terminology (visited Oct. 
20, 2002) <http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2001/wdichanginterm.html>.   
42 WTO, Report of the Panel, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," 
WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999) ¶ 7.45 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/108R.doc> (hereinafter, FSC Panel). 
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"variety and complexity of domestic tax systems."43  For example, after the United States 
enacted the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000 (ETI),44 the European 
Communities (EC) complained to the WTO that the ETI was a prohibited subsidy for U.S. 
exporters because, contrary to SCM Art. 1.1, it allowed exporters to avoid paying tax that would 
otherwise be due.45  The panel established to adjudicate the EC's complaint chose U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) §§ 11, 61, and 6346 as the appropriate legal matrix for judging whether the 
ETI allowed tax otherwise due pursuant to those three sections to be foregone.47  The choice of 
§§ 11, 61, and 63 was colorable because they state a general rule regarding the taxability of all 
corporate income.  The WTO Appellate Body, however, responded to the U.S.'s claim that the 
ETI applied only to foreign-source income by expanding the panel's matrix to include IRC 
§§ 901 and 904, which create a credit for foreign taxes paid.48  In so doing, it stated a general 
rule:  that the "benchmark" used to determine the tax otherwise due should, as much as possible, 
treat the same kind of income addressed by the alleged subsidy. 49  The benchmark chosen by the 
                                                 
43 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporations" Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, 
WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002) ¶ 91 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/108ABRW.doc> (hereinafter ETI 
App.). 
44 Pub. L. No. 106-519; 114 Stat. 2423 (2000) (codified at I.R.S. §§ 114, 941-943).  "ETI" was 
the acronym eventually chosen by the WTO Appellate Body for the new act. 
45 WTO, Report of the Panel, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 
2001) ¶¶ 1.6-1.8, 3.1 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/108RW-00.doc> (hereinafter ETI 
Panel). 
46 26 U.S.C. §§ 11, 61, 63. 
47 ETI Panel, supra note 45 at ¶¶ 8.25-8.26. 
48 ETI App., supra note 43 at ¶¶ 99-101. 
49 Id. at ¶ 90 ("In identifying the appropriate benchmark for comparison, panels must obviously 
ensure that they identify and examine fiscal situations which it is legitimate to compare.  In other 
words, there must be a rational basis for comparing the fiscal treatment of the income subject to 
the contested measure and the fiscal treatment of certain other income.  In general terms, in this 
comparison, like will be compared with like.  For instance, if the measure at issue involves 
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panel had included both domestic and foreign income without regard for the portions of the IRC 
that would change the ultimate tax to be paid with respect to foreign income.  The expanded 
benchmark chosen by the Appellate Body corrected this error by including foreign tax credits in 
the analysis. 
  SCM, Article 3 
 Subsidies (other than those allowed by the Agreement on Agriculture (AA)50) that are 
conditioned on exporting or on the use of domestic over imported inputs are prohibited in SCM 
Art. 3: 
 Article 3 
 
 Prohibition 
 
3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, 
within the meaning of Article  1, shall be prohibited: 
 
  (a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact4, whether solely or 
as one of several other conditions, upon export performance, including 
those illustrated in Annex I5; 
 
  (b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several 
other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. 
 
3.2 A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to in paragraph 1. 
__________________ 
4 This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without 
having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or 
anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to 
enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an export 
subsidy within the meaning of this provision. 
5 Measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be 
prohibited under this or any other provision of this Agreement. 
 
 The phrase "contingent . . . upon export performance" in Art. 3.1 does not mean that 
exporting must be the only way to qualify for the subsidy; only that it must be one of the ways.51  
                                                                                                                                                             
income earned in sales transactions, it might not be appropriate to compare the treatment of this 
income with employment income."). 
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In the ETI case, the U.S. made an "export precondition" argument to the WTO panel, saying that 
the ETI's benefits were not "contingent . . . upon export performance" because they could be 
received for articles manufactured entirely outside the U.S.52  The U.S. argued that, just as the 
specificity of a subsidy to one enterprise or group could be ameliorated by extension of the 
subsidy to a larger group of recipients, export-dependency could also be ameliorated by the 
addition of non-export avenues to a particular subsidy. 53  The panel would have none of it.  It 
noted that, while specificity and non-specificity are mutually exclusive, the export-contingent 
and non-export-contingent methods of qualifying for the ETI subsidy were not.54  Therefore, the 
ETI subsidy should be analyzed as two subsidies:  one, export-contingent, and the other, non-
export-contingent.  The panel used this bifurcation to ridicule the U.S. argument, saying that the 
notion that a subsidy "entirely irrelevant to export activity . . . can effectively remove export 
contingency" was "manifestly unreasonable" and "would have the practical effect of reducing the 
disciplines of the SCM Agreement to ineffectiveness and inutility."55  The way to neutralize 
export-contingency, said the panel, was to allow subsidies on goods sold directly into and for use 
in the domestic market.56  Because part of the ETI subsidy was export-contingent, it contravened 
SCM Art. 3.1(a).57 
                                                                                                                                                             
50 See supra note 34. 
51 ETI Panel, supra note 45 at ¶ 8.66-8.70. 
52 Id. at ¶ 8.62. 
53 Id. at ¶ 8.65. 
54 Id. at ¶¶ 8.66-8.67. 
55 Id. at ¶¶ 8.68, 8.69-8.70. 
56 Id. at ¶¶ 8.71-8.74. 
57 Id. at ¶ 8.75. 
 – 13 – 
 A similar analysis probably applies to a contingency on the proscribed "use of domestic 
over imported goods."58  I say probably because I have found no cases interpreting this 
provision.  However, the ETI case gives a strong hint.  The ETI had a provision limiting the 
combined non-U.S. labor and material inputs of qualifying products to 50% of the products' fair 
market value (FMV).59  In its complaint to the WTO, the EC alleged that this provision violated 
both SCM Art. 3.1(b) and GATT 1994 Art. III:4.60  The WTO panel addressed only the GATT 
leg of the EC's claim, finding that, while the ETI did not compel a U.S. producer to use U.S. 
inputs,61 it did treat imported products less favorably than parallel domestic supplies because it 
placed a limit on the former and no limit on the latter.62  The fact that taxpayers could qualify for 
ETI's benefits without using any domestic materials at all did not change the "fundamental fact 
that, as far as goods are concerned, the [50%] foreign articles/labour [sic] limitation creates an 
incentive to use domestic rather than imported goods."63  Just as the availability of ETI benefits 
to non-exporters did not negate the export-contingency for U.S. producers under SCM Art. 
3.1(a),64 the availability of ETI benefits to nonusers of domestic materials did not "vitiate the fact 
                                                 
58 SCM, supra note 35 at Art. 3.1(b). 
59 IRC § 943(a)(1)(C), 
60 ETI Panel, supra note 45 at ¶ 3.1.  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 
1994, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations[:]  Legal Instruments Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Done at Marrakesh on 15 April 
1994, vol. 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190, 33 I.L.M 1153 (1994) (hereinafter GATT 1994).  GATT 1994 
Art. III:4 reads, in relevant part: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use. 
61 ETI Panel, supra note 45 at ¶ 8.151. 
62 Id. at ¶ 8.155. 
63 Id. at ¶ 8.157. 
64 Id. at ¶ 8.64.  See supra text accompanying notes 52-57. 
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that [the foreign articles/labor limitation] inherently advantage[d] domestic goods and that less 
favourable [sic] treatment [was] thereby accorded to imported goods."65 
 In an Art. 3.1(b) context, the ETI panel would likely have reasoned that, even if ETI 
benefits were available to nonusers of domestic materials when U.S.- labor inputs were more than 
50% of FMV, they were contingent on the use of domestic over imported materials when U.S.-
labor inputs were less than 50%.  Therefore, the ETI subsidy should be bifurcated for Art. 3.1(b) 
purposes, just as it was in the 3.1(a) analysis, into contingent and non-contingent halves, with the 
contingent half constituting a violation of SCM Art. 3.1(b). 
  SCM, Annex I 
 SCM Art. 3.1(a) refers to SCM Annex I for examples of prohibited subsidies.66  The 
examples that relate to tax incentives appear in subparagraphs (e), (f), and (g) of Annex I, infra.67  
Footnote 5 in Art. 3.1 refers to measures that Annex I are "not . . . export subsidies" and that 
therefore are not prohibited by the SCM.68  Annex I contains only one clear example of such a 
measure in subparagraph (k), but it has been argued that the last sentence of footnote 59 in 
Annex I states another "permitted" export subsidy. 69  These portions of Annex I read as follows: 
 ANNEX I 
 
 ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
 
. . . 
 
(e) The full or partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, 
of direct taxes [footnote omitted] or social welfare charges paid or 
payable by industrial or commercial enterprises. 59  
 
                                                 
65 Id. at ¶ 8.157. 
66 SCM, supra note 35. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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(f) The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export 
performance, over and above those granted in respect to production for 
domestic consumption, in the calcula tion of the base on which direct 
taxes are charged. 
 
(g) The exemption or remission, in respect of the production and distribution of 
exported products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of 
the production and distribution of like products when sold for domestic 
consumption. 
 
. . . 
 
(k) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting under 
the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which 
they actually have to pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay 
if they borrowed on international capital markets in order to obtain funds 
of the same maturity and other credit terms and denominated in the same 
currency as the export credit), or the payment by them of all or part of the 
costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in 
so far as they are used to secure a material advantage in the field of export 
credit terms. 
 Provided, however, that if a Member is a party to an international undertaking on 
official export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this 
Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking 
which has been adopted by those original Members), or if in practice a 
Member applies the interest rates [sic] provisions of the relevant 
undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity with those 
provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this 
Agreement. [Emphasis added.] 
__________________ 
59 The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy where, for 
example, appropriate interest charges are collected.  The Members reaffirm the principle 
that prices for goods in transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers 
under their or under the same control should for tax purposes be the prices which would 
be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm's length.  Any Member may 
draw the attention of another Member to administrative or other practices which may 
contravene this principle and which result in a significant saving of direct taxes in export 
transactions.  In such circumstances the Members shall normally attempt to resolve their 
differences using the facilities of existing bilateral tax treaties or other specific 
international mechanisms, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of Members 
under GATT 1994, including the right of consultation created in the preceding sentence. 
Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member from taking measures to avoid the double 
taxation of foreign-source income earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another 
Member. 
Subparagraphs (e), (f), and (g) are self-explanatory:  whether a tax-related export subsidy takes 
the form of an exemption from direct or indirect taxes or a deduction, it is prohibited. 
 – 16 – 
The exception portion of subparagraph (k) (beginning "Provided that . . .") refers to the 
OECD's Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (OSEC), which was 
initiated in 1978.70  The subparagraph (k) language "or a successor undertaking which has been 
adopted by those original Members" means that this is a dynamic, standing, variable-at-will 
exception, not a grandfather clause.71  The latest published version of the OSEC appeared in 
1998,72 but an electronic version that includes subsequent amendments became available on 
October 16 of this year.73 
 The last sentence of footnote 59 in Annex I (beginning "Paragraph (e) is not intended 
. . .") appears to create an exception from the proscriptions of the SCM for export subsidies that 
"avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income."  The U.S. argued in the ETI case that the 
ETI was just such a measure, and that by virtue of footnote 59 in Annex I and footnote 5 to 
Article 3.1,74 the ETI was totally exempt from censure under SCM.75  The panel determined that 
"foreign-source income" had to refer to income "susceptible to double taxation," and that the 
word "avoid" indicated that a measure needed to have avoidance of double taxation as its 
purpose.76  It then concluded that the ETI did not have avoidance of double taxation as its 
                                                 
70 José E. Alvarez and Steve Charnovitz, Symposium: The Boundaries Of The WTO[:] 
Triangulating The World Trade Organization, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 28, 52 (2002). 
71 See WTO, Report of the Panel, Brazil–Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Second 
Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW/2 (July 26, 2001) ¶¶ 5.80-5.81, 
5.87 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/46RW2-
00.doc> (noting that subparagraph (k) is "unusual" but that it refers to the most recent "successor 
undertaking"), cited in Alvarez, supra note 70 at 52 & n.192.   
72 OECD, Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (1998) (visited 
Oct. 15, 2002) <http://www.oecd.org/ech/act/xcred/arrngmnt.htm>. 
73 This electronic version was available on Oct. 18, 2002 by using the search engine on the 
OECD website (<http://www.oecd.org>) to search for the full name of the agreement.  There was 
no URL for the document itself. 
74 Footnote 5 reads "Measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall 
not be prohibited under this or any other provision of this Agreement."  SCM, supra note 35 at 
Art. 3.1 n.5. 
75 ETI Panel, supra note 45 at ¶ 8.76. 
76 Id. at ¶¶ 8.93-8.94. 
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purpose because it did not focus on income subject to double taxation and its provisions were not 
coordinated with the U.S.'s network of bilateral tax treaties.77  The Appellate Body affirmed the 
panel's conclusion, saying that because the ETI, viewed as a whole, did not exempt only foreign-
source income, and in fact could "systematically result in a tax exemption for income that has no 
link with a 'foreign' State and that would not be regarded as foreign-source under any of the 
widely accepted principles of taxation," it did not "fall within the justification available under the 
fifth sentence of [footnote 59 in SCM Annex I]."78 
SCM, Article 27 and Annex VII 
 As noted, application of the SCM Art. 3 requirements to least developed and developing 
countries is either foregone or delayed pursuant to SCM Art. 27 and Annex VII,79 which read in 
relevant part as follows:80 
Article 27 
 
Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members 
 
27.1 Members recognize that subsidies may play an important role in economic 
development programmes of developing country Members. 
 
27.2 The prohibition of paragraph 1(a) of Article 3 shall not apply to:   
 
  (a) developing country Members referred to in Annex VII. 
 
  (b) other developing country Members for a period of eight years 
from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement,81 subject to 
compliance with the provisions in paragraph  4. 
                                                 
77 Id. at ¶¶ 8.103-8.104, 8.97-8.105.  In reaching its conclusion that the ETI did not satisfy the 
requirements of footnote 59, the panel specifically declined to address whether a measure that 
did satisfy those requirements would also fall within the scope of footnote 5 in Art. 3.1 and 
therefore be permitted under the SCM.  Id. at 8.108. 
78 ETI App., supra note 43 at ¶¶ 184-186. 
79 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
80 SCM, supra note 35. 
81 The WTO Agreement went into force Jan. 1, 1995.  See WTO, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, LT/UR/A/1 (Apr. 15, 1994) ¶ 3 
(visited Oct. 18, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/UR/FA/03-fa.doc>; WTO, 
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27.3 The prohibition of paragraph 1(b) of Article  3 shall not apply to developing 
country Members for a period of five years, and shall not apply to least 
developed country Members for a period of eight years, from the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
 
27.4 Any developing country Member referred to in paragraph 2(b) shall phase out its 
export subsidies within the eight-year period, preferably in a progressive 
manner.  However, a developing country Member shall not increase the 
level of its export subsidies55, and shall eliminate them within a period 
shorter than that provided for in this paragraph when the use of such 
export subsidies is inconsistent  with its development needs.  If a 
developing country Member deems it necessary to apply such subsidies 
beyond the 8-year period, it shall not later than one year before the 
expiry of this period enter into consultation with the Committee, which 
will determine whether an extension of this period is justified, after 
examining all the relevant economic, financial and development needs of 
the developing country Member in question.  If the Committee 
determines that the extension is justified, the developing country 
Member concerned shall hold annual consultations with the Committee 
to determine the necessity of maintaining the subsidies.  If no such 
determination is made by the Committee, the developing country 
Member shall phase out the remaining export subsidies within two years 
from the end of the last authorized period. 
__________________ 
55 For a developing country Member not granting export subsidies as of the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement, this paragraph shall apply on the basis of the level of 
export subsidies granted in 1986. 
 
27.5 A developing country Member which has reached export competitiveness in any 
given product shall phase out its export subsidies for such product(s) 
over a period of two years.  However, for a developing country Member 
which is referred to in Annex VII and which has reached export  
competitiveness in one or more products, export subsidies on such 
products shall be gradually phased out over a period of eight years.   
 
27.6 Export competitiveness in a product exists if a developing country Member's 
exports of that product have reached a share of at least 3.25 per cent in 
world trade of that product for two consecutive calendar years.  Export 
competitiveness shall exist either (a) on the basis of notification by the 
developing country Member having reached export competitiveness, or 
(b) on the basis of a computation undertaken by the Secretariat at the 
request of any Member.  For the purpose of this paragraph, a product is 
defined as a section heading of the Harmonized System Nomenclature.  
The Committee shall review the operation of this provision five years 
from the date of the entry into force of  the WTO Agreement. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Report to the WTO by the Preparatory Committee for the World Trade Organization, PC/R (Dec. 
31, 1994) ¶ 62 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/PC/R.wpf>. 
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. . . 
 
ANNEX VII 
 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS REFERRED TO 
IN PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF ARTICLE 27 
 
The developing country Members not subject to the provisions of paragraph 1(a) of 
Article  3 under the terms of  paragraph 2(a) of Article 27 are: 
 
  (a) Least-developed countries designated as such by the 
United Nations which are Members of the WTO. 
 
  (b) Each of the following developing countries which are 
Members of the WTO shall be subject to the provisions which are 
applicable to other developing country Members according to 
paragraph 2(b) of Article 27 when GNP per capita has reached 
$1,000 per annum68:  Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka 
and Zimbabwe.82 
__________________ 
68 The inclusion of developing country Members in the list in paragraph (b) is based on 
the most recent data from the World Bank on GNP per capita.83 
 As may be seen, SCM Art. 27.2(a) and Annex VII(a) provide that the proscriptions of 
Article 3.1(a) never apply to least developed countries (LDC's), as identified by the United 
Nations.84  Further, they also do not apply to any of the twenty developing countries listed in 
Annex VII(b) (which include Bolivia, Dominican Repub lic, Guatemala, Guyana, and Nicaragua) 
                                                 
82 Although Honduras is not currently included in the published versions of Annex VII(b), it does 
qualify for inclusion with a year-2000 per capita GNI of US$ 860.  See World Bank, Custom 
database search for per capita GNI, Atlas method, in current US dollars (visited Oct. 20, 2002) 
<http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>.  Further, it apparently either has been or will be 
added to Annex VII(b).  See WTO, General Council - Special Session on Implementation - 3 
October and 1 November 2001 - Minutes of Meeting - Held in the Centre William Rappard on 3 
October and 1 November 2001, WT/GC/M/70 (Jan. 10, 2002) (visited Oct. 20, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/M70.doc> (noting the thanks of the 
Honduran representative for the Members' "good faith in allowing the error excluding Honduras 
from Annex VII of the Subsidies Agreement to be corrected . . ."). 
83 The World Bank now uses the term "GNI [Gross National Income] per capita" instead of 
"GNP per capita."  See supra note 41. 
84 See supra notes 35 and 39 (noting Haiti as one of the WTO's thirty LDC members). 
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until 2003, and then only if per capita GNP (now, per capita GNI),85 as determined by the World 
Bank, has reached US$ 1,000.86  Application of SCM Art. 3.1(a) to other, non-Annex-VII 
developing countries occurs either when a country eliminates one or more export subsidies as 
"inconsistent with its development needs" or, at the latest, in 2003 unless a country has applied 
for and received an annually-reviewable extension of time to comply. 87  If a request for an initial 
extension or renewal of an existing extension is denied, a country has two years from the end of 
the "last authorized period" – either the original eight-year period or the last approved extension 
following that eight years – to "phase out the remaining export subsidies."88  SCM Art. 3.1(b) did 
not apply to developing countries until 2000, and will not apply to LDC's until 2003.89  As noted, 
the status of "developing country" is self-proclaimed, subject to challenge, and around 100 of the 
WTO's 144 members are developing countries.90 
With respect to developing countries that acceded to the WTO after its formation, some 
original members have taken the position that they should not automatically have the benefit of 
transitional periods like those included in SCM Art. 27 simply by reason of accession.  For 
instance, according to the minutes of the December 1998 meeting of the General Council, the 
U.S. argued vigorously that  
the transition periods provided for in the Uruguay Round agreements were 
intended to allow the negotiators time to become accustomed to the new rules and 
to move to address in legislation their new responsibilities.  Thus time was 
provided for full implementation.  Acceding countries were in a different position. 
Many had been observers for many years, and would have the benefit of the 
period during the accession process itself to become acquainted with WTO 
provisions.  They were dealing not with new rules, but with established rules, in 
place when the decision to accede to the WTO was made.  Thus, neither logic nor 
                                                 
85 See supra note 83. 
86 See SCM, supra note 35 at Annex VII(b) & n.68. 
87 See id. at Arts. 27.2(b), 27.4. 
88 See id. at Art. 27.4. 
89 See id. at Art. 27.3. 
90 See supra note 40. 
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the WTO Agreement itself supported the concept of acceding countries having 
automatic recourse to the flexibilities included during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.91 
The EC took the same position but ameliorated it by saying it was "not opposed, a priori, to the 
granting of transitional periods to different categories of developing countries, but expected these 
countries to help the Members understand the nature of their problems."92  Egypt took the 
opposite of the U.S. position, saying tha t "applicants from developing countries should benefit 
from all the provisions reserved for developing countries in the various WTO agreements, 
including transitional periods."93 
 Examination of the early protocols of accession shows that neither argument prevailed in 
full.  Instead, application of the original transition periods was a subject of negotiation and varied 
with each accession.  For example, on August 16, 1995, the WTO General Council decided to 
allow Ecuador to accede to the WTO.94  Although the terms of Ecuador's Protocol gave it general 
access to all transitional periods allowed original members,95 it had assured the Working Party 
that it intended to eliminate all export subsidies before accession, 96 and that assurance was 
included as an exception to the general access to transitional periods.97  Therefore, Ecuador is 
                                                 
91 WTO, General Council - Minutes of Meeting - Held in the Centre William Rappard on 9-11 
and 18 December 1998, WT/GC/M/32 (Feb. 9, 1999) 38 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/m32.doc>. 
92 Id. at 39. 
93 Id. at 36. 
94 WTO, Accession Of Ecuador - Decision of 16 August 1995, WT/ACC/ECU/5 (Aug. 22, 1995) 
(visited Oct. 18, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/ECU5.wpf>. 
95 WTO, Accession of Ecuador, WT/ACC/ECU/6 (Aug. 22, 1995) ¶ 2 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/ECU6.wpf> ("Except as otherwise 
provided for in the paragraphs referred to in paragraph 81 of the Working Party Report, those 
obligations in the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement that are to be 
implemented over a period of time starting with the entry into force of that Agreement shall be 
implemented by Ecuador as if it had accepted that Agreement on the date of its entry into 
force."). 
96 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ecuador, WT/L/77 (July 14, 1995) 
¶¶ 58-59 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/77.wpf>. 
97 Id. at ¶ 81; see Accession of Ecuador - Decision of 16 August 1995, supra note 94 at ¶ 2. 
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unaffected by the provisions of SCM Art. 27 insofar as they address export subsidies.  The 
proscription of SCM Art. 3.1(a) applies to it now in full, and has since the moment of accession. 
 When Panama was allowed to accede a little more than a year later,98 the result was 
exactly the opposite.  The terms of Panama's Protocol were similar to Ecuador's in that it, too, 
was given general access to all transitional periods allowed original WTO members99 "[e]xcept 
as otherwise provided for in the paragraphs referred to in paragraph 116 of the Working Party 
Report."100  In one of those paragraphs, Panama had assured the Working Party that it would 
"eliminate all subsidies inconsistent with the provisions of Article 3 of the [SCM]," but then it had 
finished that sentence by adding "no later than 31 December 2002, as provided by Article 27 of the 
[SCM]."101  Therefore, because Panama negotiated access to the transitional periods in SCM Art. 
27, it is entitled to the full benefit of them. 
 The following chart summarizes the interaction of SCM Arts. 3, 27, and Annex VII as 
they affect LDC's and developing countries: 
                                                 
98 WTO, Accession Of the Republic of Panama - Decision of 2 October 1996, WT/ACC/PAN/20 
(Oct. 11, 1996) (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/PAN20.wpf>. 
99 Original WTO members were those members of GATT in 1994 who accepted the terms of 
Article XI of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.  Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations[:]  Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotia tions Done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, vol. 1, Art. XI (1994) (visited Aug. 23, 
2002) <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf>. 
100 WTO, Accession of the Republic of Panama, WT/ACC/PAN/21 (Oct. 11, 1996) ¶ 3 (visited 
Oct. 18, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/PAN21.wpf> ("Except 
as otherwise provided for in the paragraphs referred to in paragraph 116 of the Working Party 
Report, those obligations in the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement 
that are to be implemented over a period of time starting with the entry into force of that 
Agreement shall be implemented by Panama as if it had accepted that Agreement on the date of 
its entry into force."). 
101 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Panama to the 
[WTO], WT/ACC/PAN/19 (Sept. 20, 1996) ¶ 63 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/PAN19.wpf>. 
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Countries Does SCM Art. 3.1(a) (export 
subsidy) apply?102 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(b) 
(domestic content subsidy) 
apply? 
Annex VII(a) LDC's (includes 
Haiti) 
Never.103  See SCM Art 
27.2(a). 
Not until 2003.  See SCM Art. 
27.3. 
Annex VII(b) developing 
countries (includes Bolivia, 
Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Guyana, and 
Nicaragua)104 
Not until 2003, and then only 
if per capita GNP has reached 
US$ 1,000.  See Annex 
VII(b).105 
Yes, since 2000.  See SCM 
Art. 27.3. 
                                                 
102 In some circumstances, relief is not available even if SCM Art. 3.1(a) applies.  See SCM, 
supra note 35 at Arts. 15.3, 27.7, 27.10-27.13. 
103 A LDC that achieves export competitiveness with respect to a particular product must phase 
out any export subsidies on that product over the next eight years.  See SCM, supra note 35 at 
Art. 27.5.  However, if it does not, it is still immune from action pursuant to SCM Art. 3.1(a) by 
virtue of SCM Art. 27.2(a).  A complaining member would have to pursue it under SCM Art. 5, 
which now always requires proof of injury.  Before 2000, SCM Art. 6.1 would have allowed 
"serious prejudice" under Art. 5(c) to be presumed in certain circumstances, but Art. 6.1 has now 
lapsed.  See SCM, supra note 35 at Art. 31 (providing that Art. 6.1 lapses five years after entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement unless extended); WTO, Report (1999) of the Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/L/341 (Nov. 5, 1999) ¶ 12 (visited Oct. 19, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/L/341.doc> (reporting that no consensus to 
extend the provisions of Arts. 6.1, 8, or 9 was reached at the Committee's regular November 1999 
meeting and indicating that a special meeting might be held before the end of 1999); WTO, Report 
(2000) of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/L/408 (Nov. 10, 2000) ¶ 12 
(visited Oct. 19, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/L/408.doc> (reporting 
that no consensus was reached to extend Arts. 6.1, 8, or 9 "either as drafted or in modified form" at 
the Committee's special meeting on December 20, 1999); WTO, Report (2001) of the Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/L/496 (Nov. 1, 2001) (visited Oct. 19, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/L/496.doc> (containing no mention of Arts. 
6.1, 8, or 9). 
104 Honduras is probably also an Annex VII(b) developing country member, but it is not 
currently listed in Annex VII(b).  See supra note 82. 
105 An Annex VII developing country that reaches export competitiveness in one or more 
products must phase out export subsidies on those products over eight years, just as a LDC must. 
See SCM, supra note 35 at Art. 27.5.  However, if it did not and its per capita GNP remained 
below US$ 1,000, it would, like a LDC, still be immune from action pursuant to SCM Art. 
3.1(a).  See supra note 103. 
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Countries Does SCM Art. 3.1(a) (export 
subsidy) apply?102 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(b) 
(domestic content subsidy) 
apply? 
Non-Annex-VII developing 
countries who were original 
WTO members (includes all 
Caribbean and Central and 
South American members 
except Ecuador and Panama) 
Not until 2003, per Art. 
27.2(b), unless a timely 
request for extension was 
filed.  If extension granted, 
3.1(a) applies 2 years after 
expiration of extension; if 
extension denied, the 2-year 
phase out still applies.106  See 
Art. 27.4. 
Yes, since 2000.  See SCM 
Art. 27.3. 
Non-Annex-VII developing 
countries who acceded to the 
WTO (includes Ecuador and 
Panama) 
Yes, but when depends on the 
individual accession proto-
col.107  If the transitional 
periods in Art. 27 apply, not 
until 2003 unless a timely 
request was filed to extend 
that deadline.  See Art. 
27.2(b).  If extension granted, 
3.1(a) applies 2 years after 
expiration of extension; if 
extension denied, the 2-year 
phase out still applies.106  See 
Art. 27.4.  If the transitional 
periods do not apply, Art. 
3.1(a) applies at the time of 
accession. 
Yes, since 2000.  See SCM 
Art. 27.3. 
 
Effect of Doha Meeting on Export Subsidies 
 The May 1998 WTO Ministerial Declaration emphasized the importance of the 
"implementation of individual [WTO] agreements and the realization of their objectives" and 
reaffirmed the organization's "commitment to respect the existing schedules for reviews, 
                                                 
106 Non-Annex-VII developing countries that reach export competitiveness in one or more 
products must phase out export subsidies on those products over two years.  See SCM, supra 
note 35 at Art. 27.5. 
107 See supra text accompanying notes 91-101. 
 – 25 – 
negotiations and other work to which we have already agreed."108  Those "existing schedules" 
included, of course, the timetable for phasing out the developing-country exceptions in SCM Art. 
27.  The United States and other countries began expressing concern as early as fall 1998 
regarding the implementation of the deadlines in the SCM and other WTO agreements for 
developing countries to phase out various subsidies.109  At a General Council meeting in 2000, 
the Members agreed to meet in special sessions to address this issue.110  Finally, at the 2001 
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, the following course of action was adopted:111 
The Ministerial Conference, 
 
Having regard to Articles IV.1, IV.5 and IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (WTO); 
 
Mindful of the importance that members attach to the increased participation of 
developing countries in the mult ilateral trading system, and of the need 
to ensure that the system responds fully to the needs and interests of all 
participants; 
 
Determined to take concrete action to address issues and concerns that have been raised 
by many developing-country members regarding the implementation of 
                                                 
108 WTO, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/1 (May 25, 1998) ¶¶ 8-9 (visited Oct. 18, 
2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/MIN98/DEC1.wpf>. 
109 WTO, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference[,]General Council Discussions on 
Implementation Issues[,] Communication from the United States, WT/GC/W/107 (Nov. 3, 1998) 
1, 8 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/W107.doc> 
(emphasizing the need for the deadlines to be observed); WTO, Preparations for the 1999 
Ministerial Conference[,] Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties[,]Communication 
from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua and 
Thailand, WT/GC/W/164/Rev.2 (June 14, 1999) ¶¶ 1-4 (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/W164R2.doc> (emphasizing the need 
for revision of the SCM, and specifically Annex VII, to extend or eliminate the existing 
deadlines and allow more developing countries to benefit from the SCM's developing-country 
exceptions). 
110 See WTO, General Council – Minutes of Meeting – Held in the Centre William Rappard on 3 
and 8 May 2000, WT/GC/M/55 (June 16, 2000) ¶ 180, Annex I (visited Oct. 18, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/M55.doc>. 
111 See WTO, Ministerial Conference – Fourth Session – Doha, 9 - 14 November 2001 – 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns - Decision of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/17 
(Nov. 20, 2001) front language, ¶¶ 10.1-10.6 (visited Oct. 19, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/min01/17.doc>. 
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some WTO Agreements and Decisions, including the difficulties and 
resource constraints that have been encountered in the implementation of 
obligations in various areas; 
 
Recalling the 3 May 2000 Decision of the General Council to meet in special sessions to 
address outstanding implementation issues, and to assess the existing 
difficulties, identify ways needed to resolve them, and take decisions for 
appropriate action not later than the Fourth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference; 
 
Noting the actions taken by the General Council in pursuance of this mandate at its 
Special Sessions in October and December 2000 (WT/L/384), as well as 
the review and further discussion undertaken at the Special Sessions held 
in April, July and October 2001, including the referral of additional 
issues to relevant WTO bodies or their chairpersons for further work; 
 
Noting also the reports on the issues referred to the General Council from subsidiary 
bodies and their chairpersons and from the Director-General, and the 
discussions as well as the clarifications provided and understandings 
reached on implementation issues in the intensive informal and formal 
meetings held under this process since May 2000; 
 
Decides as follows: 
. . . 
 
10. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
 
10.1 Agrees that Annex VII(b) to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures includes the members that are listed therein until their GNP per 
capita reaches US $1,000 in constant 1990 dollars for three consecutive 
years. This decision will enter into effect upon the adoption by the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of an appropriate 
methodology for calculating constant 1990 dollars. If, however, the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures does not reach a 
consensus agreement on an appropriate methodology by 1 January 2003, 
the methodology proposed by the Chairman of the Committee set forth in 
G/SCM/38, Appendix 2 shall be applied. A Member shall not leave 
Annex VII(b) so long as its GNP per capita in current dollars has not 
reached US $1000 based upon the most recent data from the World 
Bank. 
 
10.2 Takes note of the proposal to treat measures implemented by developing 
countries with a view to achieving legitimate development goals, such as 
regional growth, technology research and development funding, 
production diversification and development and implementation of 
environmentally sound methods of production as non-actionable 
subsidies, and agrees that this issue be addressed in accordance with 
paragraph 13 below. During the course of the negotiations, members are 
urged to exercise due restraint with respect to challenging such measures. 
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10.3 Agrees that the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures shall 
continue its review of the provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures regarding countervailing duty investigations 
and report to the General Council by 31 July 2002.112 
 
10.4 Agrees that if a member has been excluded from the list in paragraph (b) of 
Annex VII to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
it shall be re-included in it when its GNP per capita falls back below US$ 
1,000. 
 
10.5 Subject to the provisions of Articles 27.5 and 27.6, it is reaffirmed that least-
developed country members are exempt from the prohibition on export 
subsidies set forth in Article 3.1(a) of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, and thus have flexibility to finance their 
exporters, consistent with their development needs. It is understood that 
the eight-year period in Article 27.5 within which a least-developed 
country member must phase out its export subsidies in respect of a 
product in which it is export-competitive begins from the date export 
competitiveness exists within the meaning of Article 27.6. 
 
10.6 Having regard to the particular situation of certain developing-country members, 
directs the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to 
extend the transition period, under the rubric of Article 27.4 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, for certain export 
subsidies provided by such Members, pursuant to the procedures set 
forth in document G/SCM/39. Furthermore, when considering a request 
for an extension of the transition period under the rubric of Article 27.4 
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and in 
order to avoid that members at similar stages of development and having 
a similar order of magnitude of share in world trade are treated 
differently in terms of receiving such extensions for the same eligible 
programmes and the length of such extensions, directs the Committee to 
extend the transition period for those developing countries, after taking 
into account the relative competitiveness in relation to other developing-
country members who have requested extension of the transition period 
following the procedures set forth in document G/SCM/39. 
 
 Document G/SCM/39, referenced in paragraph 10.6, reads as follows:113 
 
                                                 
112 This report was submitted on July 30, 2002.  See WTO, Chairman's Report on the 
Committee's Review Mandated by Paragraph 10.3 of the Decision on Implementation-Related 
Issues and Concerns Adopted on 14 November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference, 
G/SCM/45 (July 30, 2002) (visited Oct. 19, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/SCM/45.doc>. 
113 WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Procedures for Extensions under 
Article 27.4 for Certain Developing Country Members, G/SCM/39 (Nov. 20, 2001) (visited Oct. 
18, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/SCM/39.doc>. 
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The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Committee") shall 
follow the procedures set forth below in respect of extensions of the 
transition period under Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement") for certain developing 
country members. The programmes to which these procedures shall 
apply are those meeting the criteria set forth in 2. 
   
1. Mechanism for extension  
  (a) A member that maintains programmes meeting the 
criteria set forth in 2 and that wishes to make use of these procedures, 
shall initiate Article 27.4 consultations with the Committee in respect of 
an extension for its eligible subsidy programmes as referred to in 2, on 
the basis of documentation to be submitted to the Committee not later 
than 31 December 2001. This documentation shall consist of (i) an 
identification by the member of those programmes for which it is seeking 
an extension under SCM Article 27.4 pursuant to these procedures; and 
(ii) a statement that the extension is necessary in the light of the 
member's economic, financial and development needs. 
 
  (b) Not later than 28 February 2002, the member seeking an 
extension shall submit to the SCM Committee an initial notification as 
referred to in 3(a) providing detailed information about the programmes 
for which extension is being sought. 
 
   (c) Following receipt of the notifications referred to in 1(b), 
the SCM Committee shall consider those notifications, with an 
opportunity for members to seek clarification of the notified information 
and/or additional detail with a view to understanding the nature and 
operation of the notified programmes, and their scope, coverage and 
intensity of benefits, as referred to in 3(b). The purpose of this 
consideration by the SCM Committee shall be to verify that the 
programmes are of the type eligible under these procedures as referred to 
in 2, and that the transparency requirement referred to in 3(a) and 3(b) is 
fulfilled. Not later than 15 December 2002, members of the SCM 
Committee shall grant extensions for calendar year 2003 for those 
programmes notified pursuant to these procedures, provided that the 
notified programmes meet the eligibility criteria in 2 and that the 
transparency requirement is fulfilled. The notified information on the 
basis of which the extensions are granted, including information 
provided in response to requests from members as referred to above, 
shall form the frame of reference for the annual reviews of the extensions 
as referred to in 1(d)  and 1(e). 
 
   (d) As provided for in SCM Article 27.4, the extensions 
granted by the SCM Committee pursuant to these procedures shall be 
subject to annual review in the form of consultations between the 
committee and the members receiving the extensions. These annual 
reviews shall be conducted on the basis of updating notifications from 
the members in question, as referred to in 3(a) and 3(b). The purpose of 
the annual reviews shall be to ensure that the transparency and standstill 
requirements as set forth in 3 and 4 are being fulfilled. 
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   (e) Through the end of calendar year 2007, subject to annual 
reviews during that period to verify that the transparency and standstill 
requirements set forth in 3 and 4 are being fulfilled, Members of the 
Committee shall agree to continue the extensions granted pursuant to 
1(c). 
 
   (f) During the last year of the period referred to in 1(e), a 
member that has received an extension under these procedures shall have 
the possibility to seek a continuation of the extension pursuant to SCM 
Article 27.4, for the programmes in question. The Committee shall 
consider any such requests at that year's annual review, on the basis of 
the provisions of SCM Article 27.4, i.e., outside the framework of these 
procedures. 
 
   (g) If a continuation of the extension pursuant to 1(f)  is 
either not requested or not granted, the member in question shall have the 
final two years referred to in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4. 
 
2. Eligible programmes  
 
Programmes eligible for extension pursuant to these procedures, and for which members 
shall therefore grant extensions for calendar year 2003 as referred to in 
1(c), are export subsidy programmes (i) in the form of full or partial 
exemptions from import duties and internal taxes, (ii) which were in 
existence not later than 1 September 2001, and (iii) which are provided 
by developing country members (iv) whose share of world merchandise 
export trade was not greater than 0.10 per cent,1 (v) whose total Gross 
National Income ("GNI") for the year 2000 as published by the World 
Bank was at or below US $ 20 billion,2 (vi) and who are otherwise 
eligible to request an extension pursuant to Article 27.4,3 and (vii) in 
respect of which these procedures are followed. 
__________________ 
1 According to the calculations performed by the WTO Secretariat as reflected in 
Appendix 3 to the Report of the Chairman (G/SCM/38). 
2 The SCM Committee shall consider other appropriate data sources in respect of 
members for whom the World Bank does not publish total GNI data. 
3 The fact that a member is listed in Annex VII(b) shall not be deemed to make that 
member otherwise ineligible to request an extension pursuant to Article 27.4. 
 
3. Transparency  
   (a) The initial notification referred to in 1(b), and the 
updating notifications referred to in 1(d), shall follow the agreed format 
for subsidy notifications under SCM Article 25 (found in G/SCM/6).  
 
   (b) During the SCM Committee's consideration/ review of 
the notifications referred to in 1(c) and 1(d), notifying members can be 
requested by other members to provide additional detail and clarification, 
with a view to confirming that the programmes meet the criteria set forth 
in 2, and to establishing transparency in respect of the scope, coverage 
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and intensity of benefits (the "favourability") of the programmes in 
question.4 Any information provided in response to such requests shall be 
considered part of the notified information. 
__________________ 
4 The scope, coverage and intensity of the programmes in question will be determined on 
the basis of the legal instruments underlying the programmes. 
 
4. Standstill  
   (a) The programmes for which an extension is granted shall 
not be modified during the period of extension referred to in 1(e) so as to 
make them more favourable than they were as at 1 September 2001. The 
continuation of an expiring programme without modification shall not be 
deemed to violate standstill. 
 
   (b) The scope, coverage and intensity of benefits (the 
"favourability") of the programmes as at 1 September 2001 shall be 
specified in the initial notification referred to in 1(b), and standstill as 
referred to in 4(a) shall be verified on the basis of the notified 
information referred to in 1(d) and 3(b). 
 
5. Product graduation on the basis of export competitiveness  
 
Notwithstanding these procedures, Articles 27.5 and 27.6 shall apply in respect of export 
subsidies for which extensions are granted pursuant to these procedures. 
 
6. Members listed in Annex VII(b)  
   (a) A member listed in Annex VII(b) whose GNP per capita 
has reached the level provided for in that Annex and whose 
programme(s) meet the criteria in 2 shall be eligible to make use of these 
procedures. 
 
   (b) A member listed in Annex VII(b) whose GNP per capita 
has not reached the level provided for in that Annex and whose 
programme(s) meet the criteria in 2 may reserve its right to make use of 
these procedures, as referred to in 6(c), by submitting the documentation 
referred to in 1(a) not later than 31 December 2001. 
   
   (c) If the per capita GNP of a member referred to in 6(b) 
reaches the level provided for in that Annex during the period referred to 
in 1(e), that member shall be able to make use of these procedures as 
from the date at which its per capita GNP reaches that level and for the 
remainder of the period referred to in 1(e), as well as for any additional 
periods as referred to in 1(f)  and 1(g), subject to the remaining 
provisions of these procedures.    
 
   (d) For a member referred to in 6(b), the effective date for 
the standstill requirement referred to in 4(a) shall be the year in which 
that member's GNP per capita reaches the level provided for in Annex 
VII(b). 
 
7. Final provisions  
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    (a) The decision by ministers, these procedures, and the 
SCM Article 27.4 extensions granted thereunder, are without prejudice to 
any requests for extensions under Article 27.4 that are not made pursuant 
to these procedures.   
 
   (b) The decision by ministers, these procedures, and the 
SCM Article 27.4 extensions granted thereunder, shall not affect any 
other existing rights and obligations under SCM Article 27.4 or under 
other provisions of the SCM Agreement.    
 
   (c) The criteria set forth in these procedures are solely and 
strictly for the purpose of determining whether members are eligible to 
invoke these procedures. Members of the Committee agree that these 
criteria have no precedential value or relevance, direct or indirect, for 
any other purpose. 
 
 These changes basically allow the exemptions available in SCM Art. 27 to be extended 
until 2007, instead of expiring at the start of 2003, by simple, timely demand and compliance 
with minimal transparency and standstill requirements.  The "eligible programmes" limitations in 
G/SCM/39 ¶ 2 are straightforward and provide the possibility of extension for the twenty-two 
Caribbean, Latin American, and South American WTO members whose 2000 GNI was under 
US$ 20 billion114 and who also had average 1998-2000 shares of the world merchandise export 
trade not greater than 0.10 percent.115 
 The alterations made by the Doha documents to the pre-existing SCM Art. 27 regime are 
most easily seen when the changes are overlaid in bold type on the Art. 27 chart used to 
                                                 
114 World Bank, Custom database search for GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (visited Oct. 20, 
2002) <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>.  Those countries include Antigua and 
Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.  
Uruguay, at US$ 20.289 billion, was just outside the G/SCM/39 requirement.  The World Bank 
had no GNI data for Aruba, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin 
Islands. 
115 See WTO, Chairman's Report on the Implementation-Related Issues Referred to the 
Committee at the Request of the Chairman of the General Council on 2 August and 15 October 
2001 and in the 15 December 2000 Decision of the General Council, G/SCM/38 (Oct. 26, 2001) 
34-36 (visited Oct. 21, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/SCM/38.doc>, 
cited in Procedures for Extensions, supra note 113 at ¶ 2 & n.1. 
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summarize the previous section and its footnotes.  In the annotations on the chart below, the 
Ministerial Conference's "Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns . . ." document is 
abbreviated "Imp.," and the SCM Committee's "Procedures for Extensions . . ." is abbreviated 
"Proc."  The term "'graduating' Annex VII country" means a country that leaves the Annex 
VII(b) list because its per capita GNP/GNI has finally exceeded the required amount. 
 
Countries 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(a) (export 
subsidy) apply? [original 
footnote omitted] 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(b) 
(domestic content subsidy) 
apply? 
Annex VII(a) LDC's (includes 
Haiti) 
Never.116  See SCM Art 
27.2(a). Reaffirmed.  See 
Imp. ¶ 10.5. 
Not until 2003.  See SCM Art. 
27.3. 
                                                 
116 A LDC that achieves export competitiveness with respect to a particular product must phase 
out any export subsidies on that product over the next eight years.  See SCM, supra note 35 at 
Art. 27.5.  This was reaffirmed, too.  See Imp. ¶ 10.5; Proc. ¶ 5.  However, if it does not, it is 
still immune from action pursuant to SCM Art. 3.1(a) by virtue of SCM Art. 27.2(a).  A 
complaining member would have to pursue it under SCM Art. 5, which now always requires 
proof of injury.  [The remainder of the original footnote is omitted.] 
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Countries 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(a) (export 
subsidy) apply? [original 
footnote omitted] 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(b) 
(domestic content subsidy) 
apply? 
Annex VII(b) developing 
countries (includes Bolivia, 
Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Guyana, and 
Nicaragua) [original footnote 
omitted] 
Not until 2003, and then only 
if per capita GNP has reached 
US$1,000 in constant 1990 
dollars for 3 consecutive 
years, and if that standard is 
met but GNP later falls back 
under US $1,000, the 
country will be re-included 
in Annex VII(b).  See Imp. 
¶ 10.1, 10.4.  See Annex 
VII(b).117 
"Graduating" Annex VII(b) 
countries can use G/SCM/39 
procedures.  Proc. ¶ 6. 
Existing Annex VII(b) 
countries can reserve their 
use, and the standstill 
requirement will not apply 
until they "graduate."  Id. 
Yes, since 2000.  See SCM 
Art. 27.3. 
                                                 
117 An Annex VII developing country that reaches export competitiveness in one or more 
products must phase out export subsidies on those products over eight years, just as a LDC must. 
See SCM, supra note 35 at Art. 27.5; Proc. ¶ 5.  However, if it did not and its per capita GNP 
remained below US$ 1,000, it would, like a LDC, still be immune from action pursuant to SCM 
Art. 3.1(a).  See supra note 116. 
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Countries 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(a) (export 
subsidy) apply? [original 
footnote omitted] 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(b) 
(domestic content subsidy) 
apply? 
Non-Annex-VII developing 
countries who were original 
WTO members (includes all 
Caribbean and Central and 
South American members 
except Ecuador and Panama) 
Not until 2003, per Art. 
27.2(b), unless a timely 
request for extension was 
filed.  If extension granted, 
and it will be, on an annual 
basis until 2007, if proper 
requests are filed and 
standstill and transparency 
requirements are met, see 
Proc. ¶¶ 1(c)-(e), 3-4, 3.1(a) 
applies 2 years after expiration 
of extension; if extension 
denied or simply not 
requested, the 2-year phase 
out still applies.118  See Art. 
27.4; Proc. ¶ 1(g). 
Yes, since 2000.  See SCM 
Art. 27.3. 
                                                 
118 Non-Annex-VII developing countries that reach export competitiveness in one or more 
products must phase out export subsidies on those products over two years.  See SCM, supra 
note 35 at Art. 27.5; Proc. ¶ 5. 
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Countries 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(a) (export 
subsidy) apply? [original 
footnote omitted] 
Does SCM Art. 3.1(b) 
(domestic content subsidy) 
apply? 
Non-Annex-VII developing 
countries who acceded to the 
WTO (includes Ecuador and 
Panama) 
Yes, but when depends on the 
individual accession 
protocol. 119  If the transitional 
periods in Art. 27 apply, not 
until 2003 unless a timely 
request was filed to extend 
that deadline.  See Art. 
27.2(b).  If extension granted, 
as it will be, on an annual 
basis until 2007, if proper 
requests are filed and 
standstill and transparency 
requirements are met, see 
Proc. ¶¶ 1(c)-(e), 3-4, 3.1(a) 
applies 2 years after expiration 
of extension; if extension 
denied or simply not 
requested, the 2-year phase 
out still applies.118  See Art. 
27.4; Proc. ¶ 1(g).  If the 
transitional periods do not 
apply, Art. 3.1(a) applies at 
the time of accession. 
Yes, since 2000.  See SCM 
Art. 27.3. 
 According to the WTO Secretariat, twenty-three countries have requested relief pursuant 
to SCM Art. 27 and G/SCM/39:120 
 
Country WTO Symbol WTO Date Internal Date Selected Subsidies 
     
                                                 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 91-101. 
120 See WTO, Note from the Secretariat, G/SCM/40/Rev.2 (Mar. 13, 2002) (visited Oct. 19, 
2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/SCM/40R2.doc>. 
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Country WTO Symbol WTO Date Internal Date Selected Subsidies 
     
Antigua & Barbuda G/SCM/N/74/ATG Jan. 4, 2002 Dec. 28, 2001 
tax holiday for 
enclave enter-
prises producing 
exclusively for 
export and for 
companies operat-
ing in free trade 
and processing 
zones  
Barbados G/SCM/N/74/BRB Jan. 4, 2002 Dec. 28, 2001 
income tax export 
allowance; inter-
national business 
tax incentives 
Belize 
G/SCM/N/74/BLZ/S
uppl.1 
Dec. 12, 
2001 Dec. 10, 2001 
export processing 
zones (tax holi-
days); commer-
cial free zones 
(lower income 
taxes) 
Bolivia G/SCM/N/74/BOL Jan. 10, 2002 Dec. 28, 2001 
Free Zone 
programme; 
reservation of 
extension rights 
under G/SCM/39 
¶ 6(b) 
Costa Rica G/SCM/N/74/CRI Dec. 20, 2001 Dec. 19, 2001 
Free Zone 
Regime 
Dominica G/SCM/N/74/DMA Jan. 7, 2002 Dec. 24, 2001 
income tax 
exemption for 
enclave enter-
prises producing 
exclusively for 
export 
Dominican Repub. G/SCM/N/74/DOM Jan. 8, 2002 Dec. 3, 2001 export-oriented 
free-trade zones 
El Salvador G/SCM/N/74/SLV/1 Jan. 3, 2002 Dec. 19, 2001 export processing zones 
Fiji G/SCM/N/74/FJI Mar. 5, 2002 Dec. 31, 2001 
short-term export 
profit deduction; 
export processing 
factories; export 
processing zones 
scheme 
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Country WTO Symbol WTO Date Internal Date Selected Subsidies 
     
Guatemala G/SCM/N/74/GTM 
Dec. 11, 
2001 Dec. 7, 2001 
10-year tax 
holidays under 
special customs 
regimes and free 
zones 
Honduras121 G/SCM/N/74/HND Dec. 4, 2001 Nov. 20, 2001 
tax holidays for 
free trade and ex-
port processing 
zones and for 
temporary 
imports 
Jamaica G/SCM/N/74/JAM Dec. 20, 2001 Dec. 14, 2001 
export industry 
and export free 
zone acts; FSC 
Act 
Jordan G/SCM/N/74/JOR Jan. 15, 2002 Dec. 21, 2001 
income tax 
exemption for 
export profits 
Kenya G/SCM/N/74/KEN Dec. 21, 2001 Dec. 19, 2001 
export processing 
zones 
Mauritius G/SCM/N/74/MUS Jan. 16, 2002 Dec. 19, 2001 
incentive corpo-
rate tax rate for 
export enter-
prises; tax holiday 
for freeport zone 
operators; tax 
credits for exports 
Panama 
G/SCM/N/74/PAN/
1 Jan. 4, 2002 Dec. 20, 2001 
tax holidays for 
exporters and 
companies in 
export processing 
zones  
Papua New Guinea G/SCM/N/74/PNG/Suppl.1 
Dec. 21, 
2001 Dec. 20, 2001 
export subsidy on 
Ramu Nickel/ 
Cobalt Project 
                                                 
121 Honduras claimed in its request that it was an Annex VII(b) developing country.  See WTO, 
Subsidies [–] Requests Pursuant to Article 27.4 of the [SCM,] Requests Pursuant to the 
Procedure in Document G/SCM/39 [–] Honduras, G/SCM/N/74/HND (Dec. 4, 2001) 2 (visited 
Oct. 19, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/SCM/N74HND.doc>.  For 
Honduras's status with respect to Annex VII(b), see supra note 82. 
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Country WTO Symbol WTO Date Internal Date Selected Subsidies 
     
St. Kitts and Nevis G/SCM/N/74/KNA 
Dec. 17, 
2001 Dec. 13, 2001 
15-year tax holi-
day for enclave 
enterprises pro-
ducing exclu-
sively for export 
Saint Lucia G/SCM/N/74/LCA Jan. 7, 2002 Dec. 28, 2001 
up to 15-year tax 
holiday on export 
profits 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines G/SCM/N/74/VCT Jan. 4, 2002 Dec. 31, 2001 
up to 15-year tax 
holidays for en-
clave enterprises 
producing exclu-
sively for export 
Sri Lanka G/SCM/N/74/LKA Jan. 7, 2002 Dec. 20, 2001 
Export Develop-
ment Investment 
Support Scheme 
Suriname G/SCM/N/74/SUR Jan. 7, 2002 Dec. 28, 2001 [no detail] 
 G/SCM/N/74/SUR/Suppl.1 Jan. 16, 2002 Jan. 14, 2002 
specifically states 
no "export 
subsidies" 
Uruguay122 G/SCM/N/74/URY Jan. 10, 2002 Dec. 28, 2002 
10% tax exemp-
tion for exporters 
of industrial auto-
motive products 
 
 There were two other requests for consideration under G/SCM/39 that the Secretariat did 
not place on the list.  A request specifically invoking G/SCM/39 was received from Grenada on 
Jan. 7, 2002, but the Secretariat merely noted its receipt at the end of its list of requests.123   
Inspection of Grenada's request reveals that it contains no internal date,124 and therefore, having 
                                                 
122 According to the World Bank, Uruguay's 2000 GNI, calculated using what the Bank called 
the "Atlas method (current US$)," was US$ 20,289,250,000.  See World Bank, Custom database 
search for Uruguay 2000 GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (visited Oct. 20, 2002) 
<http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>.  Therefore, Uruguay is not eligible for G/SCM/39 
benefits.  See Procedures for Extensions, supra note 113 at ¶ 2. 
123 See Note from the Secretariat, supra note 120 at 2. 
124 See WTO, Subsidies [–] Requests Pursuant to Article 27.4 of the [SCM,] Requests Pursuant 
to the Procedure in Document G/SCM/39 [–] Grenada, G/SCM/74/GRD (Jan. 11, 2002) 1  
(visited Oct. 19, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/SCM/N74GRD.doc>. 
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been received after Dec. 31, 2001, may have been felt not to comply with that deadline for 
submission of extension requests set in G/SCM/39 ¶ 1(a).  This theory is supported by the 
Secretariat's acceptance of Fiji's G/SCM/39 request, not received until March 5, 2002, but 
bearing an internal date of December 31, 2001.125  The Secretariat also received a SCM Art. 27 
extension request from Colombia that asked that Colombia be granted "the same treatment as 
regards eligible programmes and the duration of extensions of the transition period granted to 
other developing country Members that have requested such extension following the procedure 
set forth in document G/SCM/39."126  This request did have a valid internal date, Dec. 31, 2001, 
but it was properly excluded because Colombia's average share of the world merchandise export 
trade in 1998-2000 was 0.2%, double the 0.1% limit, and its 2000 GNI was US$ 85.95 billion, 
over four times the G/SCM/39 limit.127  
Conclusion 
 The extension of the SCM Art. 27 deadlines for elimination of tax-related export 
subsidies by developing countries has defused an important and incendiary issue.  Frankly, it 
would have been impossible for all twenty-three countries that have applied for the G/SCM/39 
extensions to eliminate their export subsidies by Jan. 1, 2003, and if the Art. 27 deadlines had 
been allowed to expire, it would have been possible for complaints to be filed against any of the 
twenty-three seeking authorization for countervailing duties.  At a time when the gap between 
developed and developing countries is increasing rather than narrowing, and when the value of 
                                                 
125 See WTO, Subsidies [–] Requests Pursuant to Article 27.4 of the [SCM,] Requests Pursuant 
to the Procedure in Document G/SCM/39 [–] Fiji, G/SCM/N/74/FJI (Mar. 5, 2002) 1 (visited 
Oct. 19, 2002) <http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/SCM/N74FJI.doc>. 
126 See WTO, Subsidies [–] Requests Pursuant to Article 27.4 of the [SCM,] Colombia, 
G/SCM/N/74/COL (Jan. 15, 2002) 1 (visited Oct. 19, 2002) 
<http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/G/SCM/N74COL.doc>. 
127 See Procedures for Extensions, supra note 113 at ¶ 2 (stating eligibility requirements); 
Chairman's Report, supra note 115 at 36 (noting Colombia's export trade share); World Bank, 
Custom database search for Colombia 2000 GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (visited Oct. 20, 
2002) <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>. 
 – 40 – 
fungible FDI incentives like tax subsidies is waning,128 this would have been a serious blow that 
could have effectively ended the future and current FDI that tax-related subsidies seek to attract 
and benefit. 
 The original deadlines contained in the SCM appear to have assumed that developing 
countries, properly exhorted, would comply with the 2003 deadline by phasing out their export 
subsidies over time.  This assumption, however, ignored the dilemma of the commons that I 
touched on in my beginning section:  it is never in the interest of any user of a commons to 
forego continued or additional use of the commons in an attempt to preserve it.129  To the 
contrary, it will always be in the net self- interest of each user to increase his use.130  That is 
exactly what has happened with the FDI commons.  It was not in the self- interest of any of the 
twenty-three, G/SCM/39 developing-country users to diminish their tax incentives in order to 
comply with the SCM deadlines because (1) those deadlines were never imminent (until 
recently) and (2) to do so would only have meant individual deprivation (and perhaps political 
ruin) as FDI that might have alighted on the conscientious country's shore swam on to a 
neighboring state. 
 One answer to the tax-subsidy problem, now that we have a few more years to work on it, 
is to remove the incentive to seek lower taxes by insuring that multinational enterprises engaging 
in FDI pay tax where their goods are sold.131  However, another solution that could be 
implemented in addition to or in conjunction with that effort would be to set annual deadlines for 
                                                 
128 Rajneesh Narula and John H. Dunning, Globalisation and New Realities for Multinational 
Enterprise-Developing Host Country Interaction 2, 4-5 (1998) (visited Oct. 13, 2002) 
<http://www-edocs.unimaas.nl/files/mer98015.pdf>.  Dunning developed the "ownership-
location-internalization" (OLI) paradigm of FDI.  See, e.g., John H. Dunning, Toward an 
Eclectic Theory of International Production:  Some Empirical Tests, 11 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 9, 9 
(1980). 
129 See Hardin, supra note 20 at 1244, 1246. 
130 Id. 
131 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 14 at 1666-1667. 
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incremental restrictions of existing tax incentives.  If all developing countries had to cut back 
their tax incentives annually by small amounts fairly apportioned, the risk to any one country if it 
complied with the plan and others did not would be small and therefore reasonable.  Similarly, if 
the annual phase-out amount were small, no great gain would accrue from ignoring it, and a 
country that did so would be more open to opprobrium because it had acted in defiance and 
derogation of its neighbors when there was little to be gained.  The time to begin work on such a 
plan is now, well before 2007, when the G/SCM/39 stopgap expires, and it would be best if a 
developing country or coalition of developing countries were the actor that brings such an 
incremental phase-out to the WTO General Council and the SCM Committee. 
 
* 
* * 
   
 
